Pricing Climate Event Risks and Opportunities in the Options Market

40th AWG Workshop, Innsbruck

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CLIMATE POLICY EVENTS AFFECT MARKETS Fortune¹:



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Paris Climate Deal Sinks Coal Stocks, Lifts Renewable Energy

BY REUTERS

Introduction

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December 14, 2015 at 12:35 PM EST



BBC news²:



Page last updated at 17:15 GMT, Monday, 21 December 2009





Copenhagen deal causes EU carbon price fall

Carbon prices in Europe dropped to a six-month low after agreements made at the Copenhagen climate summit to cut emissions disappointed traders.



COPENHAGEN SUMMIT 2009

KEY STORIES

· Copenhagen depresses carbon price

paris-climate-deal-sinks-coal-stocks-lifts-renewable-energy/

¹https://fortune.com/2015/12/14/

INTRODUCTION

Introduction 0000

The idea of the paper in a nutshell:

- Climate policy events such as UN climate summits or national elections affect markets.
- Ex post there are (stock) market reactions pricing in the new information.
 - Example: Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, green stocks rose while brown stocks declined (Adler et al., 2025).
- ► Are such climate policy / transition risks priced *ex ante* in the option market?
- ▶ Does the price of a stock option spanning a climate policy event depend on the "greenness" of the firm?

Introduction 0000

RESULTS

- ► In the days leading up to the Paris Agreement, OTM options were more expensive for S&P 500 firms with higher absolute climate change exposure.
- ► There is a non-monotonic relationship between firms' climate change exposure and option expensiveness preceding the event.
- ► Similar results are obtained using a larger panel of UN climate change conferences.
- ► The results hold for a different sample of European firms (STOXX Europe 600).
- ► Firms' option-implied risk premia preceding the Paris Agreement vary significantly with climate change exposure.

CONTRIBUTION

New perspective:

- ► Existing research suggests that options are more expensive for "brown" firms (Ilhan et al. (2021) or Cao et al. (2021))
 - I show theoretically and empirically that the uncertain outcomes of events affect both "green" and "brown" firms.

New methodology:

- Existing papers use traditional approaches (portfolio sorting) to measure the relation between firm's greenness and option prices
 - I apply an event based approach and compare price of affected options with neighboring unaffected options, bringing a methodology similar to Kelly et al. (2016) to the cross-section.

New "greenness" measure:

▶ Instead of ESG scores I use textual-analysis "greenness" scores.

Empirical methodology

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Outlook

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
Robustness tests

OPTION DATA

- ► OptionsMetrics provides implied volatilities (= rescaled option prices) via option price file or volatility surface file.
- ▶ I first focus on OTM Call and Put options of S&P 500 firms using deltas between 0.1 and 0.5 (OTM options have higher sensitivity to volatility changes than ITM options).

EMPIRICAL APPROACH

- ightharpoonup At time τ , a climate policy event occurs.
- ▶ Options B are *traded before* the event, but *expire after* τ at time b.
- "Control" options A or C both trade and expire either before or after τ, so are not directly affected by the event (options C maybe indirectly). I use 30 days to maturity vsf options.
- ► *Hypothesis*: The expensiveness of options B on a firm *i*, measured relative to options A and C on the same firm, will depend on the firm's climate policy exposure.




IMPLIED VOLATILITY DIFFERENCE

- ▶ I compute the average implied volatilites IV_{ar}^i , IV_b^i , and IV_c^i for firm i over 15 trading days using options A, B, and C.
- ▶ The firm's implied volatility difference IVD^i is:

$$IVD^{i} = IV_{b}^{i} - \frac{1}{2}(IV_{a}^{i} + IV_{c}^{i})$$
 (1)

▶ Alternative measure IVD_{ba}^{i} - excludes options C (relies only on information available prior to τ):

$$IVD_{ba}^{i} = IV_{b}^{i} - IV_{a}^{i} \tag{2}$$



- ► I obtain CO₂ Scope 1 and Scope 2 CO₂ emissions from CDP³ and textual-analysis based climate change exposure measures from the paper by Sautner et al. (2023)
- ightharpoonup I use them to obtain "brownness" scores B^i , and run regressions to see if a higher level of brownness is associated with higher implied volatility difference.

$$IVD^{i} = \alpha + \beta B^{i} + \gamma CV^{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
(3)

 $ightharpoonup CV^i$ stands for optional control variables (e.g. β_{Market} , B/M, Size)

Theoretical framework

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - QUICK OVERVIEW

► I assume the log return of stock i follows a factor model with a greenness factor $F_{g,t}$ ("brown" – "green"):

$$R_{i,t} = \beta_{i,g} F_{g,t} + \beta_i' F_t + \varepsilon_i$$
 (4)


- ▶ "browner" firms: $\beta_{i,g} > 0$, but "greener" firms: $\beta_{i,g} < 0$. Both are thus exposed to jump risks of the *greenness* factor.
- ► There is an expected shock to $F_{g,t}$ with variance σ_y^2 to $F_{g,t}$ at the time of the policy event τ that affects $Var(R_{i,t=\tau}) \propto \beta_{i,g}^2 \sigma_y^2$.
- ▶ Similarly, the return volatility over an (option) period spanning the climate event depends non-monotonically on $\beta_{i,g}$, and so does the implied volatility difference.





THEORETICAL PLOTS

▶ Volatility difference and slope for different exposures to the *greenness* (or climate risk) factor ($\beta_{i,g}$) and different levels of noise and variance of other factors (C).



INSIGHTS

- ▶ Blindly regressing IVD on a measure of climate policy risk exposure $\beta_{i,g}$ could lead to misleading results due to the non-monotonic relationship between IVD and $\beta_{i,g}$.
- ▶ When performing regressions, we need to carefully consider what measure is used to proxy for $\beta_{i,g}$ and which part of the graph is covered (left half, right half, entire graph?).
- ► This problem could be addressed by taking the absolute value of $\beta_{i,g}$ which effectively means we are reflecting the left part of the graph of IVD on the right part of the graph, thereby eradicating non-monotonicity problems.
- ► All else equal, the coefficient of $\beta_{i,g}$ will be closer to zero with more noise and variance in other factors.

Empirical results

DATA, VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES

- ► CO₂ emissions data from CDP
 - Higher emissions signal higher transition risk, but lower emissions don't signal higher opportunities, covers $\beta_{i,g}^+$. I thus expect a positive relation to IVD.
- Firm level climate change exposures from Sautner et al. (2023) and theoretical coverage of $\beta_{i,g}$
 - 1. cc_expo and cc_risk measure exposure to climate change, cover $|\beta_{i,g}|$
 - 2. rg_cc_expo measures exposure to regulatory risk, covers $\beta_{i,g}^+$
 - 3. op_cc_expo measures exposure to climate change opportunities, covers $|\beta_{i,o}^-|$
 - \rightarrow All above variables are positive. I expect a positive relation.
 - 4. *cc_senti* measures sentiment of firms towards climate change, positive and negative, covers entire range of $\beta_{i,g}$ ($-\beta_{i,g}$).
 - \rightarrow I expect a negative relation to $\it IVD$ for "low" sentiment firms and a positive relation for "high" sentiment firms.

Paris Agreement 2015

- ► The Paris agreement was reached on Saturday, December 12, 2015 during the COP21 climate conference in Paris.
- ▶ On the following Monday there were large return differences between stocks of "green" and "brown" firms (see introduction).
- \blacktriangleright As a start, I choose December 10, 2015 as the eventdate τ . I use monthly vsf options with 30 days to maturity. For each firm i I compute the average IV^i of OTM options with open interest in the previous 15 trading days. I proceed in a similar way using neighboring options to compute IVD^i and IVD^i_{ba}

Paris results *IVD*

Dep. Var.:	IVD						
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Scope1Em	0.066*** (4.12)						
Scope2Em	, ,	0.115					
		(1.11)					
CCExposure			2.88***				
•			(3.63)				
CCRisk			, ,	54.0***			
				(4.50)			
CCExposure ^{Reg}				()	24.7***		
					(2.60)		
CCExposure ^{Opp}					(2.00)	6.73***	
CCEAposure						(5.55)	
						(3.33)	
Observations	345	335	679	679	679	679	
R^2	0.013	0.0001	0.028	0.033	0.006	0.040	

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

PARIS RESULTS IVD_{ha}

Dep. Var.:

(2)

0.282 (1.64)

329

0.007

(3)

2.13**

(2.35)

656

0.010

 IVD_{ba}

(4)

53.3*** (2.78)

(5)

22.2* (1.79)

656

0.008

(6)

4.87*** (2.87)

656

0.009

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CCExposure

0.087***

(3.00)

Model: (1)

Scope1Em

Scope2Em

CCRisk

CCExposure^{Reg}

 $CCExposure^{Opp}$

Observations

 R^2

656


0.011



339

0.048

HISTOGRAM OF CCSenti



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RESULTS WITH CCSenti

Non-monotonic relationship between *IVD* and CC sentiment.

Dep. Variable:	IVD					
cc_senti sample:	full	full	high $[q_{0.66}, q_1]$	mid $[q_{0.33}, q_{0.66}]$	low $[q_0, q_{0.33}]$	
Variables						
CCSenti	11.5***					
	(4.78)					
CCSenti		-1.56	10.1***	-563.2	-11.1***	
		(-0.454)	(2.79)	(-1.26)	(-3.07)	
Fit statistics						
Observations	665	665	225	228	212	
R ²	0.017	0.0003	0.016	0.002	0.032	

HC robust standard errors, t-stats in parenthesess Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Results are similar when splitting into 5 subsamples.



Outlook

Robustness tests


 Methodological approach
 Theoretical framework
 Empirical results
 Robustness tests
 Outlook

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Varying Eventdate au

How does the significance depend on the choice of the event date τ ?

Note: The plots display rolling regression coefficients based on 15-trading-day windows before each event date τ , as indicated on the x-axes, and 15-trading-day windows of adjacent options used to compute IVD and IVD_{ba}



EXTERNAL VALIDITY - PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS

I use climate change conferences from 2009 to 2020

Dependent Variable:	IVD					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Scope1Em	0.042**					
	(2.51)					
CCExposure		-0.301				
CCRisk		(-0.639)	11.1**			
CCNISK			(2.19)			
CCExposure ^{Reg}			(2.17)	-2.86		
,				(-1.14)		
CCExposure ^{Opp}				` ′	-0.903	
					(-1.17)	
CCSenti						-0.753
0	0.120	0.000	0.057	0.005	0.001	(-0.451)
β_{market}	-0.139 (-0.422)	-0.090 (-0.327)	-0.076 (-0.278)	-0.085 (-0.310)	-0.091 (-0.330)	-0.088 (-0.320)
B/M	0.211	0.882***	0.885***	0.886***	0.879***	0.886***
D/141	(0.607)	(2.70)	(2.71)	(2.71)	(2.69)	(2.71)
log(market cap)	-1.32×10^{-5} *	-8.53×10^{-7}	-8.54×10^{-7}	-8.64×10^{-7}		-8.57×10^{-7}
	(-1.86)	(-0.401)	(-0.405)	(-0.406)	(-0.400)	(-0.403)
Fixed-effects						
year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,811	6,097	6,097	6,097	6,097	6,097
\mathbb{R}^2	0.379	0.382	0.382	0.382	0.383	0.382

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1



- ► Climate policy events can influence the pricing of both "green" and "brown" firms *ex ante* in the options market.
- ► Results are robust in a sample of European firms (STOXX Europe 600) and when controlling for standard factors (market, size, value).
- ► Following Liu et al. (2022), I compute option-implied risk premia which significantly correlate with firms' climate change exposure in the days before the Paris Agreement.
- ► Limitations: the analysis currently focuses only on UN climate change conferences and on U.S. and European options.
- ► Further research could expand the scope of events, firms, and regions analyzed.

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Sautner, Z., Van Lent, L., Vilkov, G., & Zhang, R. (2023). Firm-level climate change exposure. *The Journal of Finance*, 78(3), 1449–1498.

► Let's assume the log return of a stock *i* follows a factor structure:

$$R_{i,t} = \beta_{i,g} F_{g,t} + \beta_i' F_t + \varepsilon_i$$
 (5)

- $ightharpoonup eta_{i,g}$ is the exposure to a presumed climate transition risk or *greenness* factor $F_{g,t}$
- Assume that the greenness factor $F_{g,t}$ is created as a brown-minus-green portfolio return based on firms with high climate transition risk and low climate transition risk. \rightarrow "browner" firms: $\beta_{i,g} > 0$ whereas "greener" firms: $\beta_{i,g} < 0$.
- vector β_i' comprises exposures to other potentially relevant factors F_t (e.g. market, size, book-to-market, etc.)
- ε_i is a residual following a normal distribution with mean zero, $\varepsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon_i}^2)$

- ▶ Further assume the other factors F_t are constructed in such a way that they are orthogonal to the climate factor and to any other factor, e.g. by using the Gram-Schmidt process. $\rightarrow CoV(F_{k,t}, F_{l,t}) = 0$ for $k \neq l$.
- ightharpoonup A climate policy event happens at time τ
- ▶ the factors $F_{k,t}$, $k \in \{1 ... K\}$ comprised in F_t follow independent normal distributions $F_{k,t} \sim N(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2) \ \forall \ k, t$
- ► $F_{g,t}$ follows $F_{g,t} = X_t + \xi_t$ where:

$$X_t \sim N(\mu_g, \sigma_g^2), \quad \xi_t = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } t \neq \tau \\ Y \sim N(\mu_y, \sigma_y^2), & \text{if } t = \tau \end{cases}$$
 (6)

► Assuming independence of the shocks we then get the following expression for the variance of stock *i*′s return :

$$Var(R_{i,t}) = \beta_{i,g}^{2}(\sigma_{g}^{2} + \mathbf{1}_{\{t=\tau\}}\sigma_{y}^{2}) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_{i,k}^{2}\sigma_{k}^{2} + \sigma_{\varepsilon_{i}}^{2}$$
 (7)

 \rightarrow firms with higher squared exposure to the climate risk factor $(\beta_{i,g}^2)$ exhibit higher variance at the time of the climate policy event.

► The log return of the stock over the remaining lifetime of an option until maturity T is given by $\sum_{t}^{T} R_{i,t}$ and due to independence of the $R_{i,t}$ its variance is given by $\sum_{t}^{T} Var(R_{i,t})$

▶ The difference of the stock's variance over the lifetime of an option b spanning the climate event at τ and its variance over the lifetime of an option a with the same time to maturity that doesn't span the event is consequently given by:

$$\sum_{t,\tau \in t}^{T_b} Var(R_{i,t}) - \sum_{t,\tau \notin t}^{T_a} Var(R_{i,t}) = \beta_{i,g}^2 \sigma_y^2$$
 (8)

► Assume an option expires in *N* days, the volatility difference of stock *i* over the lifetime of the option spanning the event is

$$IVD_{i} = \sqrt{\beta_{i,g}^{2}(N\sigma_{g}^{2} + \sigma_{y}^{2}) + N\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_{i,k}^{2}\sigma_{k}^{2} + \sigma_{\varepsilon_{i}}^{2}\right) - \sqrt{\beta_{i,g}^{2}N\sigma_{g}^{2} + N\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_{i,k}^{2}\sigma_{k}^{2} + \sigma_{\varepsilon_{i}}^{2}\right)}}$$